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SILENCE AND PERJURY BEFORE
POLICE OFFICERS
An Examination of the Criminal Law Risks
Dale W. Broeder*
I. INTRODUCTION
Briefly stated, the purpose here is to review and to synthesize
those areas of the law bearing on the nature and extent of the
citizen's modern-day responsibilities to inform on the criminal ac-
tivities of others and to discuss the criminal law risks involved in
lying to police officers during the course of their investigations of
crime. Policy considerations, of course, are also advanced. These
subjects, it is realized, constitute only a portion, and that a com-
paratively small one, of the broad area of the extent of the citi-
zen's duty to cooperate with police officers, but, it is hoped, a suf-
ficiently important one to merit separate treatment. Certainly
there is need for such treatment if the extent of law student mis-
understanding of these subjects is any criterion. The difficulty,
however, has not primarily been with the students but rather with
the confused, intertwining and to a considerable extent overlapping
way the law has evolved in these areas. Common law misprision of
felony, modern misprision of felony statutes, duty to assist and to
obey police officers statutes, two fundamentally different varieties
of accessory after the fact statutes and obstruction of justice and ly-
ing to police statutes must all be considered together with accom-
panying caselaw and questions of policy and constitutionality in
order to get a complete picture. Previous writings in these areas
largely tend to concentrate only on one crime area, ignoring or vir-
tually ignoring the others and a particular effort has been made here
to avert at least this one difficulty.
*B.A. 1950, Willamette University; J.D. 1953, University of Chicago; mem-
ber, Illinois and American Bar Associations. Presently Associate Professor
of Law, University of Nebraska.
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Organizationally, the discussion falls into two major parts, the
first dealing with the extent of one's duty to inform on the crim-
inal activities of others, the second with the risks involved in at-
tempting to lie to police officers or to mislead them.
II. DUTY TO INFORM
A. CONVENTIONAL IDEAS
Under what circumstances, then, if any, does a citizen expose
himself to the risk of criminal liability for failing to disclose the
criminal activities of others? The conventional answer-to the ex-
tent that the texts bother any more even to discuss the question-is
that there no longer is any risk and that failure to inform on the
criminal behavior of others is not and has not for generations been
punishable.' No exceptions are considered, no qualifications drawn.
While it is almost invariably stated that the answer was once dif-
ferent as to treason and felonies, modern American authority is said
unswervedly to point in the other direction and conclusively to settle
the question.2 The Model Penal Code, for example, takes this ap-
proach and brushes the problem aside in less than a page.3
The conventional answer, however, is misleading. While the
part about misdemeanors is true-the law has never, except per-
haps in the case of law enforcement officers,4 imposed any affirma-
tive duty to report misdemeanors, regardless of the circumstances-
the matter as to treason 5 and felonies is not nearly so clear cut. As
I See, e.g., MAY, LAW OF CRIMES § 12 (4th ed. 1938); McCLAIN, CRIM-
INAL LAW § 938 (1897); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 289 (12th
ed. 1932); 9 HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 580, n.1 (Hail-
sham ed. 1933); Notes, 54 HARV. L. REV. 506 (1941); 20 NEB. L. REV. 66
(1941).
2 See authorities cited in note 1 supra.
3 MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 9, at 209 (1959).
4 Cf. People v. Herlihy, 35 Misc. 711, 72 N.Y. Supp. 389 (1901); Donnelley
v. U.S., 276 U.S. 505 (1928).
5 The question of one's criminal law obligation affirmatively to come for-
ward and to disclose his knowledge of another's treasonable acts to the
authorities is not herein discussed as there is no recorded American case
dealing with the subject. It should be noted, however, that the federal
government and many states have by statute apparently imposed such a
duty in the form of a crime known as misprision of treason. See, e.g.,
CAL. PEN. CODE § 38: '"Misprision of treason is the knowledge and
concealment of treason without otherwise assenting to or participating
in the crime. It is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding
five years." And see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8344 (1949); ILL. ANN.
STAT. c. 38, § 557 (Smith-Hurd 1935); and IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4402
SILENCE AND PERJURY BEFORE POLICE
a matter of fact, nothing about the subject seems ever to have been
altogether clear, and modern American authority at least would
seem to compel the drawing of various distinctions. Much may
depend, for example, on whether we are speaking about a simple
failure to disclose felonies to the authorities with no intention on
defendant's part of aiding the felon or of profiting from his silence
or of impeding a police investigation or on whether such factors
are present. Other distinctions may also occasionally be important.
There is some reason to believe, for instance, that failing to dis-
close information concerning another person's felonies when re-
quested to do so by law enforcement officers may be quite different
from simply failing to volunteer information, that law enforcement
officers are perhaps dealt with differently in this area from other
people and that various groups of persons who might otherwise be
subject to criminal liability for failing to speak out may be pro-
tected because of their businesses or professions or because of the
way in which information concerning the felonies comes to their
attention.
B. HISTORY
Probably it is best to begin with the history and the English
law on the question. Such distinguished common law commenta-
tors as Coke,6 Hale,7 Hawkins,8 East 9 and Blackstone ° unqualifiedly
asserted that a simple failure without any ulterior purpose to dis-
close another's felony to the authorities was punishable as a com-
mon law misdemeanor-known as misprision of felony-and that
it was a misdemeanor even to stand by and watch a felony without
at least attempting to prevent it and this latter apparently without
regard to the bystander's ability effectively to intervene. And such
statements, particularly as regards the criminality of failing to dis-
close felonies to the authorities, have many times been repeated by
later English and American commentators so as to give them almost
the force and effect of law."
(1946). A short but helpful textbook discussion will be found in MILLER,
CRIMINAL LAW 503 (1934).
6 3 COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE 139-42 (1836).
71 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 439 (1847).
8 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 440, c. 29 § 10 (8th ed. 1824).
91 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 377 (1803).
10 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 121 (Lewis ed. 1897).
"See, e.g., CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 486 (6th ed. 1958): "One
who sees another commit any felony, or knows of its commission, and uses
no means to apprehend him, or bring him to justice, or to prevent the
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The repetition, to be sure, is understandable. The early writers
are legitimately entitled to great deference and their statements
concerning the English law of misprision, though quite severe,
have an independently plausible ring when viewed in the light of
political, social and economic conditions of early England and par-
ticularly of the two and one-half centuries immediately following
the Norman conquest. The pressure of the need to protect the in-
vading Normans against a hostile countryside gave a special im-
petus to the development of an already partially established sys-
tem of communal responsibility for crime, which, once firmly es-
tablished, continued in some form in England until the early 17th
century.12 The Statute of Winchester in 1285,13 for example, com-
pelled every private citizen, according to his wealth, to provide
himself with armaments and a horse the use of which would be at
the disposal of the King's officers for the purpose of putting down
crime. It was also, of course, the duty of every able-bodied male
to pursue criminals once the "hue and cry" was raised,14 an obliga-
tion, incidentally, which stubbornly persists in modified form today
in the criminal codes of most states. 5 Finally, in order to give
added incentive to this system of communal responsibility, the
pratice was developed of fining the members of the vill or hundred
in which crime occurred for their failure or inability to produce
criminals for trial before the King's justices.' 6 Against this historical
backdrop, there would be nothing very surprising in the birth of
felony, is guilty of a (common law) misdemeanor named 'misprision of
felony.'" And see 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW 376 (12th ed. 1932);
1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW 514 (9th ed. 1923).
12 See MORRIS, FRANKPLEDGE SYSTEM 29-30 (1910).
13 STATUTE OF WINCHESTER c. 6 (1285).
14 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 599 (3d ed. 1923).
'. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-728 (Reissue 1956): "Whoever, having
been called upon by the sheriff or other ministerial officer, in any county
in this state, to assist such officer or other officer in apprehending any
person charged with or convicted of any offense against any of the laws
of this state, or in securing such offender when apprehended ... neglects
or refuses to render such assistance, shall be fined in any sum not exceed-
ing $50." See also ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 440 (1940); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-542 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 150; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 537 (1951); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 9-643 (1945). See generally,
Note, The Private Person's Duty to Assist the Police in Arrest, 13 WYO.
L.J. 72 (1958).
163 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 598 (3d ed. 1923);
The Policeman in Legal History, 170 L.T. 355-356 (1930); Law and Order
in 17th Century England, 95 J.P. 363 (1931); 1 POLLACK AND MAIT-
LAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 201 (2d ed. 1911).
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a crime such as misprision of felony. Indeed, one would almost ex-
pect such a crime to develop.
The difficulty-and we are speaking now only of a simple
failure to disclose another's felony where defendant has no ulterior
motive and no official request for information has been made, mis-
prision of felony, in other words, in its simplest form-is that none
of the early English cases supports the existence of any such crime.
17
So far as the early law is concerned, it appears to live solely in the
pages of the famous textbooks and commentaries. The commentar-
ies, furthermore, fail specifically to consider whether the defendant
must have some evil motive in keeping quiet or whether an official
request for information must be made; they simply assume that
proof of such matters is unnecessary. Also noteworthy is their fail-
ure to consider what kind and degree of "knowledge" of a felony
is necessary for guilt or exactly to whom disclosure of such "knowl-
edge" should be made. Likewise ignored is the whole subject of
privileged knowledge or communications, whether a lawyer or a
priest gaining knowledge of another's felony in his professional
capacities is guilty of misprision for failing to disclose or whether
a husband would be guilty for failing voluntarily or even on official
request to disclose his wife's felonious misdeeds or those of his
minor sons and daughters. Exceptions could, of course, and doubt-
less would be made for most of such cases but ignoring them avoids
a great deal of embarrassment and allows misprision comfortably
to live on, at least in the textbooks.
C. MODERN ENGLISH AND COMMONWEALTH AUTHORITIES
But all of this should not be taken to imply that misprision of
felony is not at least in some form currently an English crime.
Textbooks have influence and a note in Archbold's Criminal Plead-
ing'8 reveals several recent misprision of felony prosecutions in the
Central Criminal Court the details of which, however, do not ap-
pear. A misprision of felony conviction was also before the Court
of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Aberg, 9 in 1948, where defendant
was shown simply to have concealed from police her knowledge
17 The only possible exception is Anon., 7 Mod. 10, 87 Eng. Rep. 1062 (1
Queene Anne), where Chief Justice Holt stated that "li]t is a matter
indictable to bury a man that dies of a violent death before the coroner's
inquest sat upon him." This, of course, involves much more than a simple
failure to disclose a felony to the authorities.
18 ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 1512
(1954).
19 [1948] 2 K.B. 173, 1 All E.R. 601, 32 Crim. App. R. 144.
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that a convict was guilty of escape, a felony. While the Court was
not required to pass on the sufficiency of the proof since defendant
had in any event to serve a sentence running concurrently with and
longer than that imposed on the misprision count, the existence of
misprision of felony as an offense in some form seems definitely to
have been assumed. But not, it appears, in the conventional text-
book sense of a simple failure affirmatively to disclose. Lord God-
dard, C. J., delivered the following warning:
I desire to say that if in any subsequent case it is thought nec-
essary to put in a count for misprision of felony, it would be desir-
able that great care should be taken to see what, according to more
modern authorities, are the constituents of that offense . . .
If this count appears in any subsequent indictments, or if it is made
a substantive charge against a prisoner, it may be that this Court
will have carefully to consider what are the real constituents of
that offense and whether it is necessary to prove, not assume, a
concealment for the benefit of the defendant charged.20
The italicized words are, of course, ambiguous. One is not told
whether a showing of pecuniary benefit to defendant is meant or
whether some more intangible advantage might suffice nor does
the judge say definitely that a simple failure to disclose would not
now be criminal. The central point, however, is that the opinion
evinces a willingness wholly to re-examine the entire area and that,
short perhaps of knowing that misprision of felony in some form is
currently an English crime, we are still very much at sea. And
this, in substance, was the view of a Canadian court concerning
English law when required to pass on the existence of misprision
of felony as an offense in Regina v. Semenick,2' in 1955. Appellant
was convicted of misprision of felony on proof that he refused on
repeated request to reveal to police the name of the person who
attempted to murder him and that appellant knew the name of
such person. The Crown offered no proof of the motives actuating
appellant's behavior and there was no suggestion that appellant
stood to benefit economically by his silence. The Court approached
the case as one involving only a simple failure to disclose and at-
tached no importance whatever to the question of motive or to the
circumstance that appellant had been requested by the police to
disclose the name of his assailant. The Court posed two questions
for itself: 1) whether a simple failure to disclose another's felony
was criminal by English law; and 2) if it was, whether such failure
was currently punishable in Canada. The first question was an-
swered affirmatively solely on the basis of English criminal law
20 [1948] 2 K.B. 173 at 176 (emphasis added).
21 15 West. Weekly R. 333 (n.s. 1955).
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textbook pronouncements, but the Court spoke with obvious doubts
and misgivings and so answered the second question negatively.
Misprision of felony did not have that "certainty of existence" at
the English common law required for criminal culpability in Can-
ada. The conviction was accordingly upset and appellant dis-
charged. Though the Court did not specifically so state, one is left
with the impression that the result would have been no different
even had the Crown offered proof of an evil motive or shown that
appellant stood to benefit economically from his silence.
One other Commonwealth authority may also prove of in-
terest. Lord Westbury, in Williams v. Bayley, 2 equated misprision
of felony with the well-established offense of compounding a felony,
i.e., keeping silent about a felony for a consideration, and was ob-
viously of the opinion that misprision would not be committed ex-
cept on a showing of defendant's receipt of a pecuniary benefit.2
3
Under this view defendant could remain silent if he took no money
even though requested to speak out by police and though his sole
motive in remaining silent was to enable the felon to make good
his escape.
D. UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES
1. In General
So much then for history and Commonwealth authority. What
of the situation in the United States? The conventional statement,
as we have seen,24 is that there is simply no duty to disclose an-
other's felony in the United States regardless of the circumstances
and that absolutely no distinctions or qualifications have to be
drawn. And, indeed, this seems to be the case in many jurisdictions.
In the first place misprision of felony statutes as such are very un-
common in the United States. Congress has enacted one and
22 [1866] 1 H.L. 200, 6 ENG. RUL. CAS. 455.
23 Id. at 220-21, 6 ENG. RUL. CAS. at 475: "If men were permitted to trade
upon the knowledge of a crime and to convert their privity to that crime
into an occasion of advantage, no doubt a great legal and a great moral
offense would be committed. And that is what, I apprehend, the old
rule of law intended to convey when it embodied the principle under
words which have now somewhat passed into desuetude, namely, 'mis-
prision of felony.' That was a case, when a man, instead of performing his
public duty, and giving information to the public authorities of a crime
that he was aware of, concealed his knowledge, and, farther, converted it
into a source of emolument to himself."
24 See text at note 1 supra.
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labeled it as such2-3 as have the legislatures of Maine 26 and New
Jersey 27 but that is all. Nor is there the possibility in many states
of prosecuting at common law even if it be assumed that misprision
of felony is a common law crime. Most states simply do not permit
common law criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, at least one
which does has held that misprision of felony is not a common law
offense. A divided Michigan Court, in People v. Lefkovitz, 28 upset
a conviction under an information charging that defendant "had
knowledge" of a robbery and failed "to make a disclosure of said
felony to the authorities or to do anything toward the apprehension
and bringing to justice the persons guilty of the felony." "The old-
time common law offense of misprision of felony," the Court held,
was "not adopted by the Constitution because wholly unsuited to
American criminal law and procedure as used in the State. '29 And
while the opinion does not specifically so state, the broad sweep of
the language employed leaves the impression that failing to dis-
close another's felony would not be held criminal under any cir-
cumstances.
2. Under Ordinary Accessory After the Fact Statutes
Nor have prosecutions for failing to disclose another's crim-
inality ordinarily been successful under the most common form of
accessory after the fact statute. An accessory after the fact at
common law30 and by the typical modern accessory statute is one
who, "knowing that another has committed a felony . . . conceals,
or gives any other aid to such offender, with intent to enable him
to avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment. '31
While such a statute obviously does not reach one who simply fails
to disclose another's felony with no ulterior motive, failing to dis-
close, at least on official request, with intent thereby to aid the
25 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
26 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 135, § 12 (1954).
27N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 97-2 (1952).
28 294 Mich. 263, 293 N.W. 642 (1940), noted in 54 HARV. L. REV. 506 (1941),
and 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 338 (1941).
29 294 Mich. 263, 270, 293 N.W. 642, 643 (1940).
3 0 Consult PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 578-580 (1957); 1 BISHOP, CRIM-
INAL LAW 499-500 (9th ed. 1923) and authorities there cited.
31 The quoted language is taken from ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 15 (1940).
Identical or substantially identical terminology is employed in the acces-
sory statutes of most states. See, e.g., ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. §
65-3-3 (1949); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-103 (1956); LA. REV. STAT. §
14:25 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 145, § 3 (1954); S.D. CODE §
13.0203 (1939).
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principal felon might conceivably be punishable. But the cases
under an accessory statute of the type now being considered almost
uniformly hold otherwise. The word "aid" or "assists" in such a
statute, the courts have held,3 2 means something more than
"merely" failing or refusing to disclose even on official request-
harboring or concealing the felon in one's house, for example, pro-
viding him with a "get away" car or perhaps, though this is more
doubtful, with money to make good his escape 33 or helping him to
conceal evidence of his crime, all of course with the requisite
criminal intent.
But this is not so everywhere. A Massachusetts case, Common-
wealth v. Wood,3 4 leans heavily in the opposite direction. De-
fendant was convicted under a typical accessory statute of being
an accessory to an abortion and the proof showed, inter alia, that
defendant not only knew of the abortion and the name of the man
who performed it and kept silent but that he told the victim's
brother to keep his and the abortionist's names from the police and
that he lied to the police in stating that he had never seen the vic-
tim in the abortionist's house where the abortion was performed.
Obviously, the case involves much more than a simple failure to
disclose. Active assistance to the felon and lying to the police for
the felon's benefit were shown. In affirming the conviction, how-
ever, the Court sustained the trial court's refusal to charge the
jury on defendant's request that "[i]t is necessary that the de-
fendant actively aided or assisted the principal to escape arrest
or punishment" and "that the omission of the defendant volun-
tarily to give information or to assist the police in the investigation
of the principal felony is not sufficient to warrant a conviction of
the defendant as accessory after the fact." The requested instruc-
32 See, e.g., Manry v. State, 77 Ga. App. 43, 47 S.E.2d 817 (1948) ; Farmer v.
State, 56 Okla. Crim. 380, 40 P.2d 693 (1935); Hightower v. State, 78 Tex.
Crim. 606, 182 S.W. 492 (1916); Ex parte Overfield, 39 Nev. 30, 152 Pac.
568 (1915); Prewett v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 262, 53 S.W. 879 (1899); State
v. Doty, 57 Kan. 835, 48 Pac. 145 (1897) (mother convincing daughter to
lie to police in order to protect her husband from incest prosecution not
the kind of "aid" contemplated by the statute); People v. Dunn, 53 Hun
381, 6 N.Y. Supp. 805 (1899) (dicta that influencing witnesses to testify
falsely in order to aid principal not proscribed aid); People v. Pedro,
19 Misc. 300, 303, 43 N.Y. Supp. 44, 46 (1897) (same); Regina v. Chapple
(1840) 173 Eng. Rep. 866, 9 Car. & P. 355 (same); Rex v. Khadim (1869)
4 B.L.R.A.C. 7 (India) (passive failure to disclose). See also the authori-
ties cited in note 30 supra.
33 Compare Nadel v. State, 27 Ohio App. 339, 161 N.E. 296 (1927), with
United States v. Shapiro, 113 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1940). See generally, Note,
13 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 371 (1941).
34 302 Mass. 265, 19 N.E.2d 320 (1939).
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tions, the Court said, represented "too narrow a statement of the
law."
In Massachusetts, therefore, failure to disclose another's felony
to the police when requested to do so or even a refusal upon police
request to supply information which would assist them in the ap-
prehension or conviction of a felon with intent thereby to aid the
felon apparently makes one an accessory, a crime, incidentally,
which in that jurisdiction is punishable by seven years' imprison-
ment.35 The latter point should perhaps be emphasized. Wood may
proceed sufficiently far to render criminal one's failure on police
request to give information helpful in a felony investigation even
though defendant has no knowledge of the felony beyond what he
may be told by the police, provided, of course, that the felony has
been committed and defendant intends to aid the perpetrator. And
dicta in the comparatively recent North Carolina case of State v.
Potter36 under an accessory after the fact statute not expressly de-
fining the crime goes even further in one respect. According to
the North Carolina Court, merely keeping quiet concerning one's
knowledge of a felony, even when not asked by the police to speak
out, renders one an accessory provided the concealment of one's
knowledge is "for the purpose of giving some advantage to the
perpetrator of the crime . . . (and) not on account of fear. '37 An
accessory in North Carolina, it should be noted, can be sentenced
to ten years' imprisonment. 3s
While the Wood and Potter cases stand alone so far as acces-
sory statutes of the types now being considered are concerned, it
should be clearly understood that many jurisdictions possessing
such statutes have not yet had occasion to decide whether such
conduct would be criminal under them. So to decide, though per-
haps unwise and in contravention of the common law rule which
the statutes presumably were intended to codify would hardly be
far-fetched, particularly in cases where the defendant stood eco-
nomically to benefit, there was a police request to cooperate, and
no other crime could be made out. Take the case of the bank rob-
ber's mistress, for example, who, though taking no part in her
35 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 274, § 4 (1959).
36 221 N.C. 153, 19 S.E.2d 257 (1942).
37 ' Where . . . the concealment of knowledge of the fact that a crime has
been committed . . . is made for the purpose of giving some advantage to
the perpetrator of the crime, not on account of fear, and for the fact of
the advantage to the accused, the person rendering such aid is an acces-
sory after the fact." State v. Potter, 221 N.C. 153, 19 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1942).
38 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7 (1953).
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paramour's illegal activities (and who carefully avoids receiving
any of the stolen money) knows of the robbery and of her para-
mour's whereabouts but refuses to assist the police in order to
benefit her lover and to hang on to her kept position. The point
of all this, of course, is that failing to disclose another's felony or
to cooperate with the police may under some circumstances be
punishable, and severely so, even in jurisdictions with no misprision
of felony statute, no common law of crimes and a conventional
accessory after the fact statute. The discussion thus far, of course,
leaves many important questions dangling-self-incrimination, priv-
ileged communications, possible immunity for close relatives, the
meaning of "intent to aid the felon" and what constitutes "knowl-
edge that a felony has been committed." These matters are dealt
with below.3 9
3. "Obstruction" and "Resisting" Statutes
The obstruction of justice and resisting or obstructing a police
officer statutes must also be considered. While many of them, to
be sure, expressly or by reasonable implication require an actual
physical obstruction of the officer or the employment of threats
or force against him,40 a large number are broad enough to cover
the case of one who simply fails or refuses to provide information
relating to another's criminality on police request. And this ap-
parently even though defendant has no intent to aid the criminal
or any other evil motive but wishes simply to keep from being in-
volved. The Arizona obstruction statute, for example, makes pos-
sible a five-year prison sentence for anyone who "willfully . . .
delays or obstructs a police officer in the discharge or attempt to
discharge any duty of his office."'4 1 Obviously, it is a police officer's
duty to ferret out criminality and conceivably one who has knowl-
edge of another's crime and willfully fails to disclose it on police
request makes the officer's job more difficult and hence "obstructs"
or "delays" him. And while some courts have interpreted such a
statute as requiring a showing of force or physical obstruction of
the officer, (even though its terms obviously do not require it),
39 See text beginning at part F, infra.
40See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1958); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1005 (1956);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-205 (1947); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 587.5 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4314 (1955).
41 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-541 (1956). See also ALA. CODE tit. 14,
§ 402 (1940); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 843.02 (1944); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-
4401 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-705 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-729 (Reissue 1956).
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others have applied a dictionary meaning and held that "obstructs"
merely means to make the officer's job more difficult by whatever
means, forcible or otherwise.4 2 Concededly, however, no case has
been found in which someone has actually been convicted of ob-
struction for refusing to disclose information relating to another's
criminality on police request. And, so far as the cases disclose, no
prosecutor has ever attempted to obtain one.
4. "Police Obedience" Statutes
Nor, so far as the cases reveal, has any prosecution ever been
brought on the theory that one who fails to reveal knowledge of
another's crime on police request thereby violates the increasingly
more common "police obedience" type statutes or ordinances which
make it criminal to fail without lawful excuse to obey "any lawful
order" of a policeman.43 Even assuming the constitutionality of
such enactments, concerning which there is grave doubt because
their vagueness and the problem of excessive delegation of power,
presumably a police "order" for one to speak out would not be
"lawful."
5. Failure to Assist an Officer
The cases are similarly silent on whether one who knows of
a criminal's whereabouts or who is in a position to assist a police
officer by supplying information but who refuses to do so thereby
commits the crime of failing to assist an officer in effecting an ar-
rest. As previously noted,44 the duty to assist statutes, an anamalous
hangover from the posse comitatus days, are still quite common,
though their violation typically entails only a small fine or a rela-
tively short term of imprisonment. Criminal prosecutions under
them, however, have been few and far between 45 and the typical
42 The cases are collected in Annot., What Constitutes Offense of Obstructing
or Resisting Officer, 48 A.L.R. 746 (1927). See also, Comment, Types of
Activity Encompassed by the Offense of Obstructing a Public Officer,
108 U. PA. L. REV. 388 (1960); Note, The Obstruction of Justice by Inter-
ference with a Law Enforcement Officer's Performance of a Duty, 6 ARK.
L. REV. 46 (1951). The English and Scottish authorities are reviewed in
two articles by Professor Coutts, Assaulting, Resisting and Obstructing
the Police, 20 J. CRIM. L. (Eng.) 289 (1956); Obstructing the Police, 19
MODERN L. REV. 411 (1956).
43 See, e.g., State v. Pascale, 134 A.2d 149 (R.I., 1957).
44 See text at note 15, supra.
45 One such case at least is State v. Ditmore, 177 N.C. 592, 99 S.E. 368 (1919).
See generally, Note, The Private Person's Duty to Assist Police in Arrest,
supra note 15.
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modern case involving them deals with the right of an injured
"assistor" to recover against the city in tort or under the workman's
compensation law.
46
6. Conclusions as to "Conventional" Jurisdictions
Thus far, of course, the discussion has dealt solely with juris-
dictions possessing no misprision of felony statutes, no common law
of crimes and a conventional set of accessory after the fact and
obstruction of justice statutes. And while one can assert with con-
siderable confidence that a mere omission to disclose another's
felony as such is not punishable in any of such jurisdictions, a
failure to do so on police request, certainly where there is an ul-
terior motive-a desire to obstruct the police or to aid the felon-
makes the matter doubtful at least in some. Certainly the Wood
and Potter interpretations of the conventional accessory statutes
cannot be ignored in assessing the picture in a state not yet having
rejected them nor can the broad scope of many of the obstruction of
justice statutes be passed off. To be sure, however, the absence
of caselaw and the restrictive interpretations given the obstruction
statutes by many courts provide some assurance that refusal to
cooperate with police would not be criminal under them.
7. Less Conventional American Jurisdictions
Let us now turn to less conventional jurisdictions. The Vir-
ginia Court,47 for example, has stated that a simple failure to dis-
close one's knowledge of another's felony-misprision of felony,
in other words, in the conventional common law sense-is there
a common law misdemeanor and Delaware has squarely so held
under its common law of crimes statute. The Delaware Court, in
State v. Biddle,48 defined the offense as the "criminal neglect either
to prevent a felony from being committed or to bring the offender
to justice without such previous concern with or subsequent as-
sistance of him as will make the concealer an accessory before or
after the fact. '49 The proof showed that defendant was present at
a robbery and the court charged that defendant was guilty if she
46 See, e.g., Riker v. City of New York, 204 Misc. 878, 126 N.Y.S.2d 229
(1953); Blackman v. City of Cincinnati, 66 Ohio App. 495, 35 N.E.2d 164
(1941); Industrial Comm'n of Ohio v. Turek, 129 Ohio St. 545, 196 N.E.
382 (1935).
47 Wren v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. (26 Grat.) 952, 962 (1875).
48 2 W.W. Harr. 401, 124 Atl. 804 (Del. 1923).
49Id. at 124 Atl. 805 (1923).
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either did nothing to prevent the robbery or subsequently "willfully
failed and neglected to make any effort to prosecute."
Misprision of felony in some form seems likewise to be a com-
mon law offense in Vermont though not, it appears, in the absence
of a showing that defendant intends by his silence "to obstruct and
hinder the due course of justice and to cause the felon to escape
unpunished.";0 The meaning of this requirement is perhaps best
illustrated by Commonwealth v. Lopes, 1 a Massachusetts case,
which likewise deals with misprision of felony as a common law
offense. Defendant was convicted of conspiring to keep silent about
his discovery of the murdered body of one Frances McGrath. The
proof showed that defendant, a married man, and his mistress, a
married woman, went into the woods in order to commit adultery
and after having done so there discovered a girl's body which they
had reason to suppose was the body of Frances McGrath, then the
object of a well-publicized police search. Defendant agreed with
his mistress to remain silent about their discovery, but defendant
shortly thereafter reported to police the location of the body, falsely
stating that he had gone into the woods in order to relieve himself
and had been attracted to the body by a pungent odor. The con-
viction was quashed on appeal. The Court, while conceding the
possible existence of misprision of felony as a common law offense
in some form, held that a simple failure to disclose was not enough
and that it would in any event be necessary for the State to show
''an evil motive to prevent or delay the administration of justice."
Here, the "only rational inference was that the failure to disclose
the finding of the body was motivated by fear of self-incrimination,
or at least by fear of a criminal purpose wholly unconnected with
the body." The Court refused to rule on the question of whether
defendant's apparently well-grounded suspicion that the body was
that of Frances McGrath was sufficient "knowledge" of a felony
to make his agreement to remain silent criminal had the requisite
evil intent been established. The Court attached no importance to
the fact that defendant had lied to the police.
8. Statutory Misprision of Felony
So much then for misprision of felony as an American common
law offense. What of the statutes? As previously noted, there are
three American misprision of felony statutes as such, the federal
statute and those of Maine and New Jersey. Each differs from the
50 State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 Atl. 533 (1907).
51318 Mass. 453, 61 N.E.2d 849 (1945), noted in 32 VA. L. REV. 170 (1945).
Cf. Carroll v. State, 45 Ark. 539 (1885).
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other in phraseology and as authoritatively construed but the New
Jersey statute is the most unique, extending to high misdemeanors
as well as to the most serious felonies:
Any person having knowledge of the actual commission
within the jurisdiction of this state of arson, manslaughter, murder,
or of any high misdemeanor, who conceals and does not, as soon as
may be, disclose and make known the same information to a judge,
magistrate, prosecutor or police authority is guilty of a misde-
.meanor, (punishable by three years' imprisonment or by a $1,000
fine or by both).52
The phraseology, it will be noted, is "conceals and does not, as
soon as may be, disclose," and one would suppose, because of the
harshness of the statute and the absence of any requirement of evil
intent, that a simple failure to disclose, not on police request, would
not be criminal. The New Jersey Court, however, held otherwise
in State v. Hann,53 nor did the Court see fit to engraft onto the
statute any requirement of evil intent. "[T]o remain passive and
silent was, at the common law, a misprision of felony, and which
offense has been, in the passage cited from the crimes act, spe-
cialized and defined. '54 It is likewise a misdemeanor in New Jersey,
under a separate statute, to "knowingly or willfully . . .refuse to
reveal the place of abode, refuge, concealment, or disguise of any
*.. person" guilty of serious crime with intent thereby to aid such
person to escape apprehension.5 5 This statute, at least, would seem
absolutely to require an official request to disclose. One does not
refuse when never asked.
The Maine statute provides as follows:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a
felony cognizable by the courts of the state, conceals or does not
as soon as possible disclose and make known the same to someone
of the judges or some officer charged with the enforcement of the
criminal laws of the state shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than three years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment.56
The statute in question was recently before the Maine Supreme
Court in State v. Michaud,57 a 1955 case. Defendant was charged
in general terms with concealing and failing to disclose his knowl-
edge of the crime of adultery, a felony, but there were no facts
52 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 97-2 (1953).
53 40 N.J.L. 228 (1878).
54 Id. at 229.
55 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 85-2(c) (1953).
50 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 135, § 12 (1954) (Emphasis added).
57 150 Me. 479, 114 A.2d 352 (1955).
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alleged showing how defendant acquired his knowledge or of how
specifically he had concealed it. For these reasons, the Court held,
the judgment had to be reversed. The Court's opinion exhibits
great hostility towards misprision of felony as an offense and it is
at least to be doubted whether the most meticulously pleaded in-
formation would have passed muster. Be this as it may, the Court
did say that they would uphold a conviction where the information
charged and the proof established that defendant had actual
knowledge of the felony in the sense that he could testify to it in
a court of law-presumably even a direct admission from the
perpetrator would not suffice-and where the pleading and proof
showed a "positive act" of concealment. The term "positive act,"
however, was left wholly undefined and one can only speculate on
whether a simple refusal to disclose on police request would be
sufficient. However, the fact that the Maine statute employs the
disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and" as is the case
under the New Jersey and federal misprision statutes was not lost
on the Court. The Court squarely faced the point and simply held
that "or" could not really mean "or" but must mean "and," for
otherwise the statute would probably violate due process. Making
a simple failure to disclose another's felony criminal, without re-
quiring an additional showing of some "positive act" of conceal-
ment, the Court felt, would be unconstitutional. In so stating, the
Court relied heavily upon certain language to this effect in Bratton
v. United States, 58 decided under the federal misprision statute, and
to an oft-quoted dictum of Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v.
Brooks,59 that a law punishing the mere failure to proclaim every
offense that comes to one's knowledge would be "too harsh for
man." It should be noted, however, that the Maine statute as
construed by the Court does not require a showing of evil intent
as is the case in Vermont and Massachusetts. Actual knowledge
of the felony plus a positive act of concealment-perhaps merely a
failure to talk to police on request-are alone sufficient to establish
a punishable misprision. Defendant apparently need- not intend to
aid the felon, to obstruct the police or to gain in any way by his
failure to cooperate.
The federal misprision of felony statute, after which the Maine
and New Jersey statutes were patterned, was first enacted in 1790
and has been retained through the years without material change.
It now appears as Section 4 of the Federal Criminal Code and pro-
vides as follows:
58 73 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1934).
S9 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 555, 575-76 (1822).
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Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a
felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does
not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or
other person in civil or military authority under the United States,
shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both.60
The Federal statute, it will be noted, like the New Jersey
statute which copied it in material part, employs the conjunctive
"and" rather than the disjunctive "or". But whereas this made no
difference in New Jersey where a simple failure to disclose was
nonetheless held to be punishable, it has made a great deal of
difference under the Federal statute. The leading case is Bratton
v. United States.61 Defendant, a state police officer, was convicted
of misprision of felony under an indictment charging him with
apprehending two men illegally in possession of liquor under
federal law and of failing to disclose the men's felonies to the
federal authorities for a $300 consideration. (Then, as now, there
was no federal compounding statute, so the offense, if anything,
was misprision of felony). On appeal, the conviction was reversed.
The language employed in the federal statute, the Court noted, is
'conceals and does not as soon as may be disclose:' "
Some meaning must be given to the words 'conceal and.' If it
should be held that a failure to disclose is in itself a concealment,
then a conviction may be had for a failure to disclose without more,
and the words 'conceal and' are thus effectively excised from the
statute.62
Furthermore, the Court continued:
[S]ome such interpretation is necessary to rescue the act from
oppressiveness and to eliminate a serious question of constitutional
power. Whatever may have been the case in 1790, when federal
felonies were few, the act if otherwise construed would be but
another unworkable and unenforceable law in latter days. Take the
case here: The defendant was a state police officer; he would be
guilty of a felony, under any other interpretation, even if he turned
his prisoner over to the proper state authorities . . . if he failed
promptly to report the arrest to federal authority. The bystander
who saw a federal felony committed would become a felon if he
did not promptly report it, although federal officers apprehended
the criminals on the spot. The guest at a club or a dinner in Eastern
Oklahoma would lately have been a felon if he had not promptly
reported to the nearest federal judge the fact that he observed
60 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
61 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934). See also United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d
515 (D. Mass. 1930), aff'd 281 U.S. 624 (1931); Presont v. United States,
281 Fed. 131 (6th Cir. 1922); Notes, 29 MICH. L. REV. 617 (1931); 28
MICH. L. REV. 935 (1930).
62 73 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1934).
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another guest in possession of a beverage of a proscribed alcoholic
content. An interpretation leading to such an intolerable conclu-
sion should not lightly be imputed.63
Accordingly, the Court ruled, the government must show
''something more than a mere failure to disclose-some affirmative
act of concealment, such as suppression of the evidence, harboring
of the criminal, intimidation of witnesses, or other positive act
designed to conceal from the authorities the fact that a crime has
been committed. '64 Whether the term "or other positive act" would
render criminal lying to a federal investigative officer the Court
fails to say but certainly lying is in common parlance affirmative
or "positive" in nature. And it may well be that an obstinate
refusal to talk to a federal investigative officer with knowledge of
another's felony would similarly be held criminal though this, of
course, is much more doubtful, particularly in view of the Court's
"positive act" illustrations. One point, however, is clear. The Court
attached no importance to the fact that defendant had received a
consideration for his silence since the consideration paid was
merely the "motive for, and not an act of, concealment." In England,
as we have seen, and perhaps also in Vermont and Massachusetts,
the consideration aspect of the case might have made all the
difference.
One further point of importance. Neither the Bratton opinion
-or any other interpreting the federal misprision statute, for that
matter-even remotely suggests that defendant's "positive act of
concealment" must be for the felon's benefit, for his own or for
anyone's. Assuming that defendant has "knowledge" of a felony
and is guilty of a "positive act" of concealment, no evil motive or
intent need be shown.
Furthermore, at least one federal case, Grudin v. United
States,65 though not a misprision of felony case as such, suggests
that a mere failure to disclose another's felony is criminal and that
no positive act of concealment need be shown. Thus defendant in
Grudin was held justified on Fifth Amendment grounds in refusing
to answer certain questions concerning his receipt of a check be-
cause he might have discovered by such receipt that the "sender
was engaged in the actual commission of a felony in violating the
Espionage Act and [that he] did not as soon as possible make it
known to some judge or other person in civil or military authority."
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 198 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1952).
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9. Other Statutes
One final group of statutes must also be noted. Eight states-
Arizona,68 Arkansas,6 7 Colorado,
68 Idaho, 69 Illinois,70 Montana,
71
Nebraska 72 and Utah 73-while possessing no misprision of felony
statutes labeled as such, do possess accessory after the fact statutes
which on their face and with practically no variation in wording
make penal a simple failure with no evil intent to disclose an-
other's felony to the authorities-misprision of felony, that is, in
the conventional common law sense. The maximum punishment
possible under these statutes, furthermore, is severe, ranging from
a possible two years plus $500 fine in Idaho 74 Illinois75 and Ne-
braska70 to a maximum of five years in Arizona, 77 Montana
78 and
Utah.79 And the Arkansas accessory Statute under some circum-
stances even permits a sentence of life imprisonment.
80 The con-
ventional accessory after the fact statute, as we have seen,
8
' follow-
ing the common law cases, requires an intent to aid the felon and,
by usual judicial construction, some "affirmative act" in addition.
The accessory statutes of the kind now being considered-at least
so far as their wording is concerned-do not. The Nebraska statute,
for example, defines an accessory after the fact, as "a person who,
after full knowledge that a felony has been committed, conceals
it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the person charged
with or found guilty of the crime.
8 2
Concededly, however, no case has been found in which a court
66 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-141 (1956).
67 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-120 (1947).
68 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-13 (1953).
69 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-205 (1947).
70 ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 584 (Smith-Hurd 1935).
71 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-205 (1947).
72 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-202 (Reissue 1956).
73 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-45 (1953).
74 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-205 (1947).
75 ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 584 (Smith-Hurd 1935).
76 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-202 (Reissue 1956).
77 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-143 (1956).
78 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-206 (1947).
79 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-46 (1953).
80 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-121 (1947).
81 See text at notes 32-33 supra.
82 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-202 (Reissue 1956) (Emphasis added).
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has actually held that a simple failure to disclose one's knowledge
of another's felony to the authorities would, absolutely nothing
else being shown, render one an accessory under such a statute.
Indeed, the California Court, under an accessory statute of this
type, now repealed, squarely held otherwise. Defendant in People
v. Garnett8s was convicted as an accessory after the fact to grand
larceny and the proof showed only that defendant knew of the
larceny and failed to disclose his knowledge to the authorities. The
conviction was upset. The Court, while noting that the statute was
"tnot as plain and explicit as it might be, by any means," construed
the word "conceals" to mean "more than a simple withholding of
knowledge possessed by a party that a felony has been committed.
S. .[C]oncealment necessarily includes the element of some
affirmative act upon the part of the person tending to or looking
towards the concealment of the felony. Mere silence after knowl-
edge of its commission is not sufficient to constitute the party an
accessory. '8 4 Somewhat similar language may also be found at
one point in a recent opinion of the Colorado Court, in Lowe v.
People.85 Neither the Garnett nor the Lowe opinion, however, con-
tains anything helpful on the meaning of the phrase "affirmative
act."
On the other hand, a Nebraska case, Heyden v. State, 6 appears
to look in the opposite direction. In affirming defendant's con-
viction on a charge of harboring felons, the Nebraska Court upheld
the trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to show that
defendant's failure to "run to the sheriff . . .or to . . . the chief
of police" and inform them of the felons' whereabouts was moti-
vated by excitement and ignorance of their responsibilities. In
ruling that excitement or ignorance were not of themselves de-
fenses, the Court seems to have assumed that the only way one
having knowledge of another's felony can escape conviction as an
accessory is to disclose his knowledge to a magistrate as such.
Even a disclosure to police would apparently not suffice. Noting
that the statute made concealment from the magistrate unlawful,
the Court then proceeded to observe that the offer of proof re-
ferred only to police officers and that police officers "were not
'magistrates' within the meaning of the act." No other case even
remotely suggests such a construction. It should also be em-
phasized that Heyden involved a harboring rather than a con-
83 129 Cal. 364, 61 Pac. 1114 (1900) (Emphasis added).
84 129 Cal. 364, 365, 61 Pac. 1114, 1115 (1900).
85 135 Col. 209, 309 P.2d 601 (1957).
86 114 Neb. 783, 210 N.W. 165 (1926).
SILENCE AND PREJURY BEFORE POLICE
cealment of knowledge charge and that the Court's apparent
assumption about the criminality of failing to disclose to a magis-
trate was made solely for the purpose of ruling on a question of
evidence.
So much then for the bare failure voluntarily to come forward
and disclose another's felony under these statutes. The implication
from Heyden aside, such failure is probably not criminal under
them. The cases strongly suggest, however, that little else may be
required. The point is perhaps best made by Fields v. State, 7 an
Arkansas case. Defendant was convicted of being an accessory after
the fact to a homicide on proof that the killing occurred in his
presence and in his room and that he not only made no report
that the killing occurred in his room and no report of the crime
which he had witnessed, but that he attempted to thwart a police
investigation by telling a material witness that she "would not be
mixed up in the matter provided she knew nothing." While the
judgment of conviction was reversed because defendant had never
expressly refused to cooperate with the police the Court left no
doubt that the result would have been different had evidence of
such lack of cooperation been present. Accessorial guilt, the Court
stated, would be established either by the showing of "some affirma-
tive act tending toward the concealment of [a felony's] com-
mission or (by) a refusal to give knowledge of the commission of
the crime when (the) same is sought for by officials of the person
having such knowledge."8 8 Nor did the Court read into the statute
any requirement of evil intent. In Arkansas, at least, simple re-
fusal on police request to disclose one's knowledge of another's
felony makes one an accessory after the fact.89 Absent a showing
of some "affirmative act," the nature of which has never been
clearly defined, however, a police or other official request is
necessary.
The only other relevant body of caselaw under these statutes
is from Colorado and the situation there, to say the least, is confus-
ing. While it seems reasonably clear that a mere failure to come
forward voluntarily and to disclose one's knowledge of another's
felony is not criminal in Colorado, a failure to do so on police
request makes the matter doubtful. Language in two of the cases
87213 Ark. 899, 214 S.W.2d 230 (1948).
88 Id. at 214 S.W.2d 230, 231 (1948) (Emphasis added).
89 It should be noted that Fields v. State is merely one of a large number
of Arkansas cases so stating. The authorities are cited in the Fields opin-
ion.
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seems on balance to make such refusal to cooperate criminal"
while that in a third,91 the most recent of the cases, would seem to
make it criminal only upon a showing that defendant's reason
for refusing to cooperate was to aid the felon. Under the latest
pronouncement, in other words, refusing to talk on account of
excitement or because of a fear of becoming involved would pre-
sumably be excusable.
It should be emphasized, however, that what we are talking
about now is a simple statement to police by a person having
knowledge of another's felony that he will not cooperate, that he
refuses to speak. If, instead of so stating, such person denies to
police that he has any knowledge when he does we probably have
a very different case. Such denial of knowledge to police almost
certainly makes such person an accessory in Colorado where he
intends thereby to aid the felon and probably where he simply
wishes to keep from being involved. Such, at least, is the im-
plication from Roberts v. People92 and Howard v. People93 where
the Colorado Court affirmed accessory to homicide convictions
in large part on proof that defendants, having personal knowledge
of homicides and knowing of deceaseds' whereabouts, repeatedly
denied having such knowledge to police officers. While the de-
fendants in these cases also helped conceal the bodies, that fact
is not heavily relied upon in either case and the language of both
opinions is such as to make criminal a defendant's mere denial of
knowledge to police. And this is likewise the implication from a
more recent Colorado case, Lowe v. People94 with the qualification
that under it defendant's denial of knowledge must probably be
for the purpose of aiding the felon. A general consideration of the
criminality of lying to police is deferred until later.9 5 The subject
has been introduced here only to clarify the point being discussed,
namely, the criminality of merely refusing on police request to
disclose one's knowledge of another's felony.
E. SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES
To what then does the situation boil down? A summary of
the law at this point seems to be in order. In jurisdictions possessing
90 Roberts v. People, 103 Colo. 250, 87 P.2d 251 (1938); Howard v. People,
97 Colo. 550, 51 P.2d 594 (1935).
91 Lowe v. People, 135 Colo. 209, 309 P.2d 601 (1957).
92 103 Colo. 250, 87 P.2d 251 (1938).
93 97 Colo. 550, 51 P.2d 594 (1935).
94 135 Colo. 209, 309 P.2d 601 (1957).
95 Infra., pt. III A(1).
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no misprision statutes as such, no commonlaw of crimes and con-
ventional accessory after the fact and obstruction of justice statutes,
there is probably no duty to disclose one's knowledge of another's
felony under any circumstances. No case involving even an at-
tempted prosecution for failing to disclose one's knowledge, whether
on police request or otherwise, has been found under the obstruction
statutes and those statutes have in any event often been given a
restrictive interpretation. The conventional accessory statute, of
course, requires by its terms an "intent to aid the felon" and, as
judicially construed, some "affirmative act" in addition. And the
term "affirmative act" under the conventional accessory statute
has generally come to mean "something more" than a failure to
disclose one's knowledge even on police request. On the other hand,
cases from Massachusetts and North Carolina look the other way
on this point and it must be continually borne in mind that the
courts of many states possessing conventional accessory statutes
have not yet spoken.
At the other extreme are jurisdictions such as Virginia and
Delaware whose courts have either held or stated that misprision
of felony exists as a common law offense which is committed
merely by having knowledge and remaining silent regardless of
one's intent and whether or not there is a police request to speak
out, and New Jersey whose misprision statute has been interpreted
to yield a similar result. Misprision of felony likewise exists as a
common law offense in Vermont and possibly in Massachusetts
also-and one may be guilty even though not requested to speak
out by police-but there must be a showing in those jurisdictions
of some "improper motive" for remaining silent, such as a desire
to obstruct the police as distinguished from a simple desire to
avoid becoming involved.
Misprision of felony likewise, as we have seen, exists by statute
in Maine and federally, and no evil intent need be shown, but
certainly in Maine and probably under the federal statute mere
silence with knowledge will not suffice. There must be some
"affirmative" or "positive" act in addition. Whether the term
"affirmative act" covers the case of one refusing to talk to police
or one denying his knowledge to police, however, is uncertain but
the latter is very probably criminal. Finally, there are the less
conventional accessory after the fact jurisdictions just considered
where concealing from the magistrate makes one an accessory.
While the courts of many of these jurisdictions have not yet had
occasion to interpret the word "conceals," the caselaw of the juris-
dictions which have seems to indicate that merely remaining silent
is not criminal. Remaining silent with knowledge on police request,
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and, a fortiori, denying(6ne's knowledge to police, however, very
possibly makes one an accessory under these statutes.
F. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS
So much then, for our brief interstitial survey of the law.
Several important questions, involved in most of what has gone
before but intentionally left dangling, remain to be considered.
One, of course, is the meaning of "knowledge" as employed in the
conventional accessory after the fact statutes and in the offense of
misprision of felony and the term "full knowledge" as contained
in the concealment from the magistrate type of accessory statute.
One reads in the newspapers, for example, that a house has been
broken into and property taken or that a young girl of a certain
description is missing or one is told of these things by police
officers. Does one thereby acquire "knowledge" or "full knowl-
edge" that a felony has been committed? Or does one only have
"knowledge" or "full knowledge" who actually witnesses a felony
or if not actually a witness is told by the supposed perpetrator that
he has committed a felony? The caselaw, as might be supposed, is
ambiguous. The only opinion squarely discussing the point is
State v. Michaud,96 decided under the Maine misprision of felony
statute. Michaud, it will be recalled, requires actual personal
knowledge of the felony in the sense that one is able to testify
to it in a court of law. Under Michaud, one must actually witness
the felonyY Other misprision and concealment from the magis-
trate type accessory cases, however, appear to assume that knowl-
edge in this direct personal sense is unnecessary but that reason-
able belief which happens to coincide with the truth is all that is
required.9 8 This construction, furthermore, would be supported by
precedent under the conventional accessory statutes where reason-
able belief coinciding with the truth is all that has ever been re-
96 150 Me. 479, 114 A.2d 352 (1955).
97 "It must be actual and personal knowledge. It must not be knowledge
from hearsay, or from possibilities or probabilities. It must be firsthand
knowledge by the respondent of all facts necessary to know that the
alleged felony has been committed." Id. at 354.
98 See, e.g., Wren v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. (26 Grat.) 952, 956 (1875).
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quired,9 9 by the receiving stolen property cases 00 where a similar
construction of "knowledge" has prevailed and by the harboring
cases where defendant's reasonable belief that he is shielding a
felon has been held sufficient for culpability. 10 1 No case has been
found discussing or even adverting to the question of whether the
term "full knowledge" as employed in the concealment from the
magistrate type of accessory statutes is different from the mere
"knowledge" required under the conventional accessory after the
fact statutes and in the offense of misprision of felony. The term
"full knowledge" might well be interpreted to require a showing
of direct personal knowledge, particularly as the Maine statute,
which merely uses the word "knowledge," was held to require this.
There is, however, yet another and perhaps even more im-
portant question lurking in the background. The wording of the
misprision statutes and the common law definition of that offense
as well as the concealment from the magistrate type accessory
statutes require a concealment of knowledge of the felony. Only
concealment of knowledge of the felony seems to be made criminal.
Even though one does possess "knowledge" or "full knowledge" of
a felony in the required sense, in other words, he would presum-
ably not render himself criminally culpable in a misprision of
felony or concealment from the magistrate type jurisdiction merely
by refusing to disclose some collateral bit of information which
might be helpful to the police in their investigation of a felony.
Assume, for example, that Jones has knowledge of a criminal
homicide and also knows the present whereabouts of the perpetra-
tor. He can presumably avoid criminal liability so far as common
law misprision and statutes of the kind now being considered are
concerned merely by informing the authorities of his knowledge
of the felony. He need not go further and tell the police of the
perpetrator's present whereabouts and the result should be no
different even though he is expressly requested to do so by police.
The common law definition of misprision, the misprision of felony
statutes and the concealment from the magistrate type accessory
99"[it is sufficient for the State to show that the accused had actual
knowledge of facts which would give him good reason to believe [empha-
sis supplied] that the person harbored or assisted by him was guilty of
the felony." Robertson v. State, 69 Ga. App. 541, 26 S.E.2d 142, 143 (1943).
See generally, 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 96 (1940).
100 "That guilty knowledge, or its equivalent, guilty belief, is of the gist
of this offense has been declared by many decisions." Meath v. State,
174 Wis. 80, 83, 182 N.W. 334, 335 (1921). See generally, PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 278 (1957).
101 E.g., Heyden v. State, 114 Neb. 783, 210 N.W. 165 (1926).
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statutes at most require a disclosure of one's knowledge of a felony,
not one's knowledge of circumstances which, if known to the au-
thorities, would be helpful in their investigation. That this con-
struction is the correct one, furthermore, would seem to be sup-
ported by the statutory pattern currently prevailing in New Jersey.
While New Jersey possesses a misprision of felony statute inter-
preted as requiring one to disclose his knowledge of another's
felony without more, the legislature nevertheless felt it necessary
to punish under a separate statute one who with intent to aid a
felon "knowingly or willfully . . . refuse[s] to reveal the abode,
refuge, concealment or disguise of any . . . person" believed guilty
of serious crime. 0
2
This distinction between knowledge of a felony and knowl-
edge of circumstances helpful in a felony investigation may not,
however, hold true in some jurisdictions possessing conventional
accessory after the fact statutes, assuming that defendant intends
by his silence to aid the felon. The conventional accessory statute,
it will be recalled, punishes one who, "knowing that another has
committed a felony . . . conceals, or gives any other aid to such
offender, with intent to enable him to avoid or escape from arrest,
etc." And while most courts have held under these statutes that
refusing to talk to police concerning one's knowledge of another's
felony is not criminal, one Massachusetts case 10 3 suggests that
refusal to cooperate with police, even as regards the disclosure of
helpful collateral circumstances, would make one an accessory pro-
vided defendant's intent was thereby to aid the felon. While the
Massachusetts case stands alone, it should again be emphasized
that many courts possessing conventional accessory statutes have
not yet passed on the criminality of such conduct.
There is also the matter of exemptions for close relatives and
the question of privileged communications. As previously noted,
criminal law texts discussing common law misprision make no
mention of exemptions for close relatives. Common law misprision
cases are similarly silent on the question as are the New Jersey,
Maine and federal misprision statutes. Some conventional1 04 and
some concealment from the magistrate type accessory after the fact
102 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 85-2(c) (1953).
103 Commonwealth v. Wood, 302 Mass. 265, 19 N.E.2d 320 (1939). Compare
State v. Doty, 57 Kan. 835, 48 Pac. 145 (1897).
104 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 15 (1940); FLA. STAT. § 776.03 (1944); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 610.13 (1947).
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statutes,105 however, do have such exemptions. But many do not.10 6
The absence of such exemptions in the misprision and accessory
areas, it must be conceded, is a highly embarrassing circumstance
to the existence of criminal liability for refusing to divulge one's
knowledge of another's felony to a policeman regardless of who
would thereby be implicated. The prospect of incarcerating a
husband on a misprision or accessory theory for refusing to talk
over his wife's felonious misdeeds with a policeman, in other words,
would doubtless cause many courts wholly to deny criminal liability
for failing to speak out, whether as regards the felonious activities
of close relatives or of other persons. On the other hand, a court
faced with such a prospect might circumvent the problem to some
extent at least by judicially incorporating the entire law of
privileged communications into the accessory and misprision fields.
Concededly, however, this would not help for all situations-
brother against sister or parent against child, for example, or for
any case in which one's knowledge was acquired by a means other
than a privileged communication.
This, then, brings us broadly to the question of privileged
communications. Suppose a lawyer or a psychiatrist or a priest, for
example, acquires knowledge of someone's felony by reason of a
privileged communication. Would any court hold him liable on a
misprision or accessory theory for failing to divulge such knowledge
at the behest of a policeman? To ask the question is practically
to answer it. The law of privileged communications must of neces-
sity be applied. But here again is an embarrassing consideration
to the existence of criminal liability for failing to disclose one's
knowledge of another's felony to a police officer. Cases, statutes,
and texts are uniformly silent on the applicability of the law of
privileged communications.
Finally, there remain certain broad questions of policy and
constitutionality. First of all, is it either wise or constitutionally
permissible criminally to penalize one who, having knowledge of
another's felony in the required sense, fails affirmatively to seek
out a magistrate or a law enforcement officer and divulge such
knowledge? So far as wisdom is concerned, the answer quite clearly
is no. There is in the first place the difficulty above mentioned
concerning the general absence of exemptions for close relatives
and the ambiguity over the applicability of the law of privileged
105 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 584 (1935).
106 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 32 (1955); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-604 (1953);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-202 (Reissue 1956). See generally, Morse, A Sur-
vey of Accessory After the Fact Exemptions, 54 DICK. L. REV. 324
(1950). In all, twenty-two state statutes exempt close relatives.
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communications. And what constitutes "knowledge" or "full
knowledge" that a felony has been committed? And who but one
knowledgeable in the law can in most cases draw the line between
felony and misdemeanor and know with some assurance even if he
recognizes what conduct theoretically constitutes a felony whether
one has in fact and in law been committed? More fundamentally,
of course, requiring one affirmatively to seek out a magistrate or
police officer on pain of imprisonment is simply too great an
infringement of the citizen's right to be left alone and to keep his
own counsel, particularly in these days of highly trained and
efficient law enforcement departments. And if one is in fact re-
quired to do this and does not, his knowledge of another's felonious
misdeeds then becomes sacred and inaccessible because of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Requiring him to testify con-
cerning his knowledge after he has failed affirmatively to come
forward would violate the privilege and indeed this has at least
twice judicially been recognized" 7 and was in one federal case
actually so held. 0 8 There is, in the case of the federal misprision
statute, at least one additional difficulty. As noted in Bratton v.
United States,10 9 a state police officer arresting one who to his
knowledge has committed both a federal and state felony by the
same act would be guilty of misprision if he failed to contact
federal authority even though he handed his man over to the state
for prosecution. So far as the constitutional question is concerned,
one is compelled to conclude with Chief Justice Marshall that a
law requiring one affirmatively to come forward and to divulge
one's knowledge of another's felony is indeed "too harsh for man."
The objections raised to punishing one who fails affirmatively
to come forward and divulge apply with almost equal force to the
practice sanctioned by statute and decisions in some jurisdictions
of penalizing one as an accessory or for misprision who fails to
divulge his knowledge of another's felony on police request. There
is, in addition, this consideration applicable to both situations. One
having knowledge of another's felony will, by the same token,
typically possess information constituting a link in the chain of
evidence which could be used to convict him of that very felony.
Is there not, then, a valid self-incrimination objection if he is
required on pain of punishment to divulge it? The answer, of
course, is no, so far as a courtroom situation is concerned where a
107 Grudin v. United States, 198 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1952); State v. Van
Bueren, 13 N.J. Super. 592, 81 A.2d 42 (1951).
108 Grudin v. United States, 198 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1952).
109 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934).
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judge sits impartially to determine whether under all of the cir-
cumstances there is any risk of a criminal prosecution against the
witness if he is compelled to answer.1 0 There is, on the other hand,
no such impartial arbiter in the police station, and to compel a
layman, without the benefit of counsel, to decide whether there
is any such risk, particularly when he will not have at his disposal
all of the relevant circumstances, would appear to make a mockery
of the privilege. Concededly, however, the Supreme Court's un-
fortunate decision in In re Groban,"1 allowing an Ohio fire marshal
to subpoena possible arson suspects and to interrogate them under
oath in private without allowing their counsel to be present shows
that this is not necessarily the test, at least insofar as due process
is concerned.
III. ATTEMPTS TO LIE TO OR MISLEAD OFFICERS
A. RISK OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1. In General
We have now considered various situations in which one may
possibly render himself criminally culpable by failing or refusing
to disclose the criminal activities of others and discussed related
questions of policy and constitutionality. Let us now turn to the
closely related question of whether and under what circumstances
lying to the police or other investigative officers may be criminal.
And while our starting place will be the criminality of lies about
the criminal activities of third parties, the nature of the problem
and the decisions as well as the wording of various statutes bearing
on the question make it necessary in addition to consider the
criminality of lies to police and other officials by one who is him-
self suspected of crime. To some extent, of course, the problem
has already been discussed. Some of the misprision cases, it will
be recalled, most notably Bratton v. United States,1" 2 decided under
the federal misprision statute, while holding that the word "con-
ceals" requires more than a simple failure voluntarily to disclose
another's criminality to the police, appear to assume that lying
to the police about one's knowledge of another's felony would be
the kind of "affirmative act" necessary for misprision guilt. In
addition to misprision cases such as Bratton, however, consideration
of the present subject invites analysis of three additional statutory
areas: accessory after the fact, obstruction or resistance to police
110 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
111352 U.S. 330 (1957).
112 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934).
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and certain statutes and ordinances expressly making it criminal
to make false statements or reports to police or other government
officials.
2. Accessory After the Fact Cases
The accessory after the fact cases are best disposed of first.
An accessory after the fact at common law and under the conven-
tional modern accessory statute, it will be recalled, is one who,
knowing that a felony has been committed, and with intent to
aid the felon, assists him to escape arrest, trial or punishment. The
question, then, is the simple one of whether one who lies to the
police in order to aid a felon thereby criminally "assists" him
within the meaning of the accessory after the fact definition. The
English common law answer, it seems reasonably clear, was "no."
Accessorial guilt at common law was incurred only by acts which
give "personal aid and comfort" to the felon himself, such as con-
cealing him in one's house and giving him food, supplying him
with a disguise or with transportation to elude the authorities,
perhaps giving him money, providing him with a weapon with
which to combat the authorities or physically assisting him to resist
arrest or to break jail.113 Even concealing evidence of the felon's
crime or intimidating witnesses who would otherwise testify against
him does not seem to have been sufficient. 1 14 Concealing evidence
and intimidating witnesses, while doubtless of great benefit to the
felon, would not be assistance to him "personally." And merely
lying to the police would seem to be a fortiori. At common law,
the act of assistance must apparently be given directly and per-
sonally to the felon himself.
And a few cases decided under conventional modern accessory
statutes appear to follow the common law rule. In Farmer v.
State,"5 for example, defendant was convicted as an accessory after
the fact to the crime of assault with intent to kill and the proof
showed that he lied to an investigating sheriff in saying that he
did not know the principal felons and that he did so in order to
help them avoid arrest. The Attorney General's confession of
error was approved by the Oklahoma Court as "there ... [was] no
evidence . . . to show that the defendant rendered any active as-
113 See generally the authorities cited in notes 30 and 32, supra. And see
Commonwealth v. Giacobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 19 A.2d 71 (1941); Levering v.
Commonwealth, 132 Ky. 666, 117 S.W. 253 (1909).
114 Regina v. Chapple, [1840] 9 Car. & P. 353, 173 Eng. Rep. 865.
115 56 Okla. Crim. 380, 40 P.2d 693 (1935).
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sistance personally to the party charged with the felony."116 A line
of Texas cases, on the other hand, also decided under a conventional
accessory statute, takes the position that lying to the police for
the felon's benefit makes one an accessory; 1 17 some of the cases
even make accessories out of persons who lie to private citizens in
order to mislead the police or who conspire with others to lie to
the police. 118 Suborning witnesses to lie for a felon's benefit at a
preliminary hearing or a coroner's inquest similarly makes one an
accessory.119 In Texas, at least, accessorial guilt need not be pre-
dicated on acts which assist the felon "personally." The word
"4assists" in the accessory statute is given the meaning it has in
everyday conversation. On the other hand, at least so far as the
lying to police cases are concerned, there appears to be a distinction
in Texas between falsely asserting to a police officer that one knows
nothing about a felony when he does and an "affirmative lie" to
police by which defendant seeks to throw suspicion away from the
felon, as by giving him an alibi or by manufacturing a self-defense
story when defendant knows the felon is guilty of first degree mur-
der. A lie of the former or denial of all knowledge type is ap-
parently not criminal.120
What, then, about lying to the police under the less conven-
tional "concealment from the magistrate type" accessory after the
fact statutes? One case, Ex Parte Overfield,121 while not a lying
to the police case as such, adopts the common law "personal aid
and comfort" to the felon rule and clearly assumes that a lie to
a police officer for the felon's benefit would not make one an ac-
cessory after the fact. On the other hand, as discussed earlier,
122
several cases decided under statutes of this type appear rather
clearly to adopt the contrary rule.
116 Accord, State v. Doty, 57 Kan. 835, 48 Pac. 145 (1897); Regina v. Hussian
Bakhsh (1903, India), 25 Indian L.R. (Alka. Series) 161.
117 See, e.g., Little v. State, 111 Tex. Crim. 500, 14 S.W.2d 853 (1929). But
see Prewett v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 262, 53 S.W. 879 (1899).
118 Jones v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 479, 272 S.W.2d 368 (1954); McGoodwin
v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 231, 115 S.W.2d 634 (1938); Turner v. State, 112
Tex. Crim. 245, 16 S.W.2d 127 (1929). Compare Pinkard v. State, 62
Tex. Crim. 602, 138 S.W. 601 (1911).
119 Orr v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 252, 61 S.W.2d 490 (1933); Blakeley v. State,
24 Tex. Crim. 616, 7 S.W. 233 (1888).
120 The distinction is perhaps most clearly made in Tipton v. State, 126 Tex.
Crim. 439, 72 S.W.2d 290 (1934).
12139 Nev. 30, 152 Pac. 568 (1915).
122 See text at notes 92-94.
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Regardless of the form of the accessory statute with which one
is concerned, however, one important point should be kept in mind.
If defendant's motive in lying to the police is merely to avoid his
own arrest, such lie will almost certainly not make him an acces-
sory after the fact even though the direct effect of his lie is to
aid a felon to avoid arrest, trial or punishment. Singularly, only
one case has been found illustrating the point, Reg. v. Jones,123 de-
cided in 1948. Appellant, who was acquitted on a number of counts
charging him, his wife and another person, of receiving stolen
property, was convicted as an accessory after the fact to his wife's
crime of receiving stolen property. The proof showed that de-
fendant knew that his wife had stolen the property and that it
was stored in his house but that he falsely denied to police that
he knew the location of the property. The conviction was quashed
because of the failure of the trial judge specifically to instruct the
jury to acquit "if the motive in the mind of the appellant was
merely a desire to avoid his own arrest.' 1 24 To hold otherwise, of
course, would be tantamount to punishing defendant's mere un-
sworn denial of his own guilt to a police officer and seriously run
afoul of the policy underlying the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
3. Obstruction of Justice Cases
Let us now turn to the obstruction of justice cases. Many of
the obstruction statutes, as we have seen,'125 are on their face broad
enough to make punishable not only lying to police but even a
failure to cooperate with them, as by refusing to talk when ordered
to speak out. Yet we saw that no obstruction prosecution merely
for refusing or failing to talk-either about one's own involvement
with crime or about the criminal activities of others-has appar-
ently ever been attempted. It should be noted, however-and this
is a point not previously made-that prosecutions for such silence
have occasionally been instituted on other theories, (disorderly
conduct and vagrancy, for example), but the result, again, has
uniformly been negative.
12 G
123 [19481 2 All E.R. 964, 1 K.B. 194 (1949).
124 [1948] 2 All E.R. 964, 966, 1 K.B. 194, 196 (1949).
125 See text at part II D (3), supra.
126 E.g., People v. Tinston, 6 Misc.2d 485, 163 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1957); Common-
wealth v. Chalmers, 76 Pa. D. & C. 218 (1950). See also, Myers v. Collett,
1 Utah 2d. 406, 268 P.2d 432 (1954). See generally, Note, Police Control
Over Citizen Use of the Public Street, 49 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 562
(1959).
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Obstruction prosecutions for lying to police, on the other hand,
while infrequent, have sometimes been instituted. Results have
varied. Where the obstruction statute requires by its terms a
"forcible" or "physical" obstruction of the officer, no case has been
found sustaining such a prosecution. But negative results have
also sometimes obtained under statutes construed as not requiring
a physical obstruction. Miller v. United States127 is illustrative.
Defendant was convicted under a federal statute penalizing anyone
who "knowingly and willfully obstructs ... or opposes any officer
of the United States . . . in serving . . . any legal . .. process.
12 8
Proof showed that defendant refused to permit federal officers to
enter her home to serve a subpoena on one Morris and that she
knowingly and falsely denied to the officers that Morris was then
in her home. The conviction was upset. While conceding that the
statute did not require a physical obstruction, the Court was em-
phatic that "certainty in the nature of criminal offenses forbids...
the use of this section as a catch-all to make crime out of actions
which law-enforcing agents may feel to be undesirable, but which
Congress has not seen fit to prescribe.' 1 29 If lying to police was
to be made a punishable obstruction, Congress would have to be
much more specific.
Some cases take a different view. A lower Pennsylvania court,
for example, in People v. Citren,130 indicated its willingness to
sustain an obstruction conviction merely on proof that defendant
willfully and falsely denied to police that a certain person was in
his place of business.1 3 1 The Pennsylvania statute was similar to
the federal statute involved in Miller. Rex v. Sharpe and Stringer1
8 2
should also perhaps be noted. One of the defendants, while motor-
ing, knocked down and injured a cyclist and the two defendants
agreed to tell a story which would disprove any charge that the
car in question was involved in an accident. They maintained this
story upon police investigations and induced a third person to make
false statements to police officers corroborative of the invented
story. Defendants' convictions for conspiring to obstruct justice
were sustained. The theory of the convictions, it should be noted,
127 230 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1956).
128 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1958).
129 230 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1956). See also, Davis v. Lisle, [19361 2 All
E.R. 213, 2 K.B. 434, 155 L.T. 23.
180 66 P.R.R. 232 (1946).
131 See also, In re Billington, 156 App. Div. 63, 141 N.Y. Supp. 16 (1913);
Rex v. L., 51 Ont. L.R. 575, 583; 69 D.L.R. 618, 625 (1922).
182 [1938] 1 All E.R. 48, 159 L.T. 96.
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was conspiracy to obstruct and considerably more than a bare
denial of guilt to police by the suspected party was shown. The
Court failed to distinguish between conspiracy to obstruct and
obstruction, however, and apparently saw no self-incrimination
policy question as to the defendant actually involved in the ac-
cident. But perhaps the conspiracy aspect of the case did make
the difference. This would certainly be supported by recent de-
velopments under the omnibus federal conspiracy statute in the
United States133 and it is noteworthy that the Scottish Court, on
facts very similar to Sharpe and Stringer, refused to sustain ob-
struction as distinguished from conspiracy to obstruct convictions.
34
From the standpoint of a defendant himself suspected of crime,
of course, there would appear to be no sound policy basis for dis-
tinguishing between a non-punishable affirmative falsehood to
police by which the suspected defendant seeks to exonerate himself
and a punishable agreement between defendant and another not
involved or suspected to tell the police an affirmative falsehood.
The distinction, if there is to be one, should be between an affirma-
tive falsehood by the suspected defendant and his bare false denial
of guilt. The latter type lie should never be punishable; to do so
would emasculate the policy underlying the privilege against self-
incrimination. Indeed, as will later be argued,135 neither type lie
should in the usual case be punishable, and it is at least highly
debatable whether, apart from certain highly exceptional situations,
lying to the police should ever be punishable, either in the case of
suspects or non-suspects.
4. Statutes and Ordinances Making False Statements Criminal
One final group of statutes and caselaw remains to be consid-
ered. Delaware 136 and Michigan 137 possess statutes making it unlaw-
ful knowingly to report fictitious crimes to the police, and an Eng-
lish Court, in King v. Manley,'138 has held such conduct to constitute
a common law offense. Enactments in four other states-Mary-
133 See e.g., United State v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
134 Curlett v. M'Kechnie, [1939] 1 Scots L.T.R. 11 (Justiciary, 1938). Com-
pare Hinchcliffe v. Sheldon, [1955] 3 All E.R. 406, 99 Sol. J. 797; Betts v.
Stevens, [1910] 1 K.B. 1; Bastable v. Little, [1907] 1 K.B. 59.
135 See text beginning at note 158, infra.
136 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 103 (1953).
137 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.643(1) (1954).
138 [1933] 1 K.B. 529 (defendant falsely reported that she had been robbed
and gave to police a fictitious description of the non-existent robber).
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land,139 Nebraska, 140 Washington,1 4' and Wisconsin142-go even fur-
ther. Statutes there-and ordinances in municipalities throughout
the nation143-penalize any knowingly false statement to a police of-
ficer, even a criminal suspect's knowingly false oral and unsworn
denial of guilt. Penalties for such false statements, it should be
noted, range from a possible maximum of ninety days in Maryland
to one year in Wisconsin.
But the harshness of the above enactments becomes benevo-
lence when compared with the rigor of Section 1001 of the federal
criminal code. This statute, representing virtually the ultimate in
attempts to ensure honesty by citizens in dealings with government
officers,'4 4 provides as follows:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any depart-
ment or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsi-
fies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a mate-
rial fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
13 9 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 150 (1957).
140 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-744 (Supp. 1959). This section provides as fol-
lows: "Any person who furnishes information he knows to be false to
any law enforcement officer who operates under the authority of the
State of Nebraska or any political subdivision or court thereof, or other
official, with the intent to instigate an investigation of an alleged crim-
inal matter, or to impede an investigation of an actual criminal matter,
shall be fined in a sum of not to exceed five hundred dollars, or im-
prisoned in the county jail for a term not to exceed six months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment."
141 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.060 (1956).
142 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.41 (2) (b) (1958).
143 Some of these ordinances, it should be noted, are phrased in terms of
false "reports" to police officers rather than false "statements" and it
has accordingly been held that an oral false "reply" to a policeman's
question as distinguished from a false formal written or "volunteered
report" is not punishable. Compare People v. Smith, 131 Cal. App.2d
289, 281 P.2d 103 (1955) (non-punishable false oral reply), with People
v. Minter, 135 Cal. App.2d 838, 287 P.2d 196 (1955) (punishable false
oral statement by defendant who went to police station of his own mo-
tion and accused certain persons of perjury).
144 Perhaps the absolute ultimum in this regard is represented by Section
120 of the Canadian Criminal Code which makes possible a five year
prison sentence for anyone "causing a police officer to enter upon an
investigation . . . by doing anything . . . to divert suspicion from him-
self."
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statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.145
Section 1001, it will be noted, covers any knowingly false state-
ment to a government agent or department whether oral or written,
sworn or unsworn, material or immaterial and regardless of any
intent to mislead or gain any benefit so long as the statement con-
cerns a matter "within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States." It covers false statements by suspects in crim-
inal cases and would even extend if read literally not only to bare
false denials of culpability by criminal suspects but to a criminal
defendant's knowingly false plea of not guilty on his arraignment.
The penalty, furthermore-five years in prison and a $10,000 fine-
is extremely harsh.
Judicial interpretation of § 1001 has been almost unbelievably
literal and it has been made to cover, among a host of other
things, 146 oral and written lies to federal internal revenue agents
by actual criminal suspects in income tax fraud investigations 147
and even in one case to a false oral report of a theft to an Assistant
United States District Attorney.""s The leading case is Marzani v.
United States.149 Defendant, a State Department employee, was
shown to have falsely told his superior at some point during an
informal non-compulsory two hour meeting called at defendant's
request and at which no one else was present that he, defendant,
145 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958) (Emphasis added). The history of § 1001 is
traced in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955); United States
v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941), and United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339
(1926).
146 See, e.g., Frazier v. United States, 267 F.2d 62 (1st Cir. 1959) (defendant
successfully prosecuted for having falsely indicated on omnibus army
induction form that he had never attended communist party meetings);
United States v. Private Brands, Inc., 250 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1957) (suc-
cessful prosecutions of defendants for having lied to FBI agent con-
cerning the quality of certain merchandise during latter's criminal in-
vestigation of defendants); United States v. Myers, 131 F. Supp. 525
(N.D. Cal., 1955) (defendant, a federal employee, falsely stated on offi-
cial government form that a certain person had purchased an auto from
the War Assets Administration).
147 Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1955) (false oral state-
ment by defendant to internal revenue agent conducting an audit of de-
fendant's returns that certain monies had been received by him as an
agent so that they would not be taxable); Cohen v. United States, 201
F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1953) (false written statement of defendant's net
worth given to internal revenue agents at their informal request during
a tax conference).
148 United States v. Van Valkenburg, 157 F.Supp. 599 (D. Alaska 1958).
149 168 F.2d 133 af 'd, 335 U.S. 895 (1948).
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was not a communist and that he had never been known by the
name of Tony Whales. Defendant's statements were oral and un-
sworn, there was no stenographic or other transcription of de-
fendant's statements, no proof that defendant knew of the possible
criminal-law consequences of his lies and no showing of any limita-
tion, formal or otherwise, of the subjects to be covered at the meet-
ing. Indeed, a great variety of subjects were discussed and de-
fendant and his superior were friends and called one another by
their first names throughout the two hour meeting. Defendant's
conviction under Section 80, the predecessor of Section 1001, was
nevertheless affirmed over defendant's due process objections and
such judgment was in turn affirmed by an equally divided United
States Supreme Court.150
Post-Marzani precedent has followed that case and even per-
haps expanded upon it.151 The requirement obtaining in federal
perjury cases that the falsity of defendant's statement be proved
by two witnesses or by one witness plus convincing corroborative
evidence seems now definitely to have been held inapplicable to
§ 1001 prosecutions.1 52 And no court has thus far insisted on proof
that defendant knew (or even should have known) of the possible
criminal-law consequences of lying, that a warning was given of
the possible scope of the inquiry or that defendant was given the
opportunity of being interviewed in the presence of his attorney.
Nor has any court talked or even so much as suggested the neces-
sity of apprising defendant of his right to remain silent.
5. Conclusions
The wisdom of enactments such as § 1001 is, to say the least,
highly dubious. They first of all tend to discourage public coopera-
tion with the police by making persons interviewed during a police
investigation liable to criminal prosecution merely on the basis of
a policeman's recollection of what might have been said, often, per-
haps usually, in a highly charged emotional situation. Lawyers must
of necessity frequently advise silence in the face of such a risk.
Such enactments, furthermore, ignore the stringent proof require-
150 See note 149 supra.
151 A few courts, however, balking at the oppressiveness of § 1001, have
applied a strict construction of the term "statement" and of what con-
stitutes a "matter within the jurisdiction" of particular agents or agen-
cies of the United States. See, e.g., Rolland v. United States, 200 F.2d
678 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. Moore, 185 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1950);
United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
152 See the discussion and citation of authorities in DeCasus v. United States,
250 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1957).
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ments which have always obtained in the case of perjury and there
is not, of course, (as the statutes embrace both written and oral
statements), the written proof of the statement having been made as
there is in the usual perjury and false swearing case. Again, there
is no requirement of materiality other than that the officer be con-
ducting a lawful investigation. A woman lying about her age to
a policeman is dealt with on the same basis as one lying about the
whereabouts of a murderer. Nor-unless due process would require
it-does criminal liability under these statutes require the presence
of a lawyer, the solemnity of an oath or so much as a warning from
the investigator of the consequences of a lie'53 or of the scope of the
inquiry.5 4
Finally, such enactments, at least when applied to the false
statements of criminal suspects and particularly to their bare false
and unsworn denials of culpability, do violence to the spirit of the
law of entrapment and to the spirit if not the letter of the privilege
against self-incrimination. And, indeed, the force of the self-in-
crimination point as it relates to actual criminal suspects has been
at least once judicially noted. A federal district court, in Meyer v.
Brownell,155 strongly intimates that the Fifth Amendment would
bar a Section 1001 prosecution upon a showing that federal agents
were contemplating a criminal prosecution of the defendant at the
time his false statements were made to them. Such a ruling, of
course, would be in accord with precedent in analogous situations.
A grand jury indictment returned against a person called and sworn
by them to answer at a time when the grand jury is contemplating
a criminal prosecution against such person, for example, has tra-
ditionally been subject to outright dismissal on self-incrimination
grounds.m 6 And this, it should be noted, regardless of whether such
person was or was not informed by the grand jury of his right
to remain silent. 5 7 The constitutional evil lies merely in the at-
tempt to question under such circumstances.
B. UNDER THE MODEL PENAL CODE
The Model Penal Code, it should be observed, has tentatively
made unsworn falsification to police officers a misdemeanor. Sec-
tion 208.22 of the 1957 Tentative Draft provides as follows:
153 Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
154 Cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
155 137 F. Supp. 594, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
156 See, e.g., State ex rel. Poach v. Sly, 63 S.D. 162, 257 N.W. 113 (1934);
People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468 (1959).
157 Ibid.
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A person commits a misdemeanor if, with intent to mislead an
official in performing his official function:
(a) he makes any written false statement which he does not
believe.
This, to be sure, is a vast improvement on enactments such as
§ 1001. The crime is made a misdemeanor rather than a felony,
there is an intent to mislead requirement and the false statement
must be in writing. There is, however, no meaningful requirement
of materiality-a lie about one's address is as bad as one concerning
culpability-there is no insistence on a warning of the consequences
of making a false statement and the section is broad enough not
only to cover an affirmative attempt by a criminal suspect to exon-
erate himself but even his bare false denial of guilt.
Some lies to police should, of course, be punishable and the
Model Penal Code is doubtless on sound ground when it penalizes
in a minor way, as it does in Section 208.24,158 the giving of false in-
formation to police with intent to implicate another and the report-
ing of non-existent crimes or false leads. The above-quoted Section
208.22, however, is something else again and the same may be said
of § 208.32,159 the Code's accessory section, which, following the view
taken in a minority of states, makes a felon out of one who "volun-
teers" false unsworn information to police officers with intent to
158 § 208.24 of Tentative Draft No. 6 (1957) provides as follows: "Section
208.24. False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities.
(1) Falsely Incriminating Another. A person who knowingly gives
information to any law enforcement officer, with purpose to implicate
another, commits a misdemeanor.
(2) Wasting Enforcement Facilities. A person who causes a law
enforcement officer to act in reliance on false information commits a
petty misdemeanor in the following circumstances:
(a) where the actor reports to law enforcement authorities an
offense or other incident within their concern, knowing that it did
not occur; or
(b) where the actor pretends to furnish information relating
to an offense or incident when he knows he has no such information."
159 § 208.32 of Tentative Draft No. 9 (1959) provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
"Section 208.32. Aiding Another to Avoid Prosecution or to Consummate
Crime.
(1) Avoiding Prosecution. A person commits an offense if, with
purpose to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punish-
ment of another for crime, he: * * *
(e) attempts to mislead law enforcement officers by volunteer-
ing information which he knows to be false.
Violation of this subsection is a felony of the third degree if the conduct
which has been charged or is liable to be charged against the person
aided would constitute a felony of the first or second degree. Otherwise,
violation of this subsection is a misdemeanor."
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mislead them and to aid the principal offender. The meaning of the
word "volunteers" in § 208.32 however, is unfortunately not spelled
out either in the Code proper or in accompanying comments but
it is in any event clear that there is again no meaningful materiality
requirement, and no need for a warning of the possible criminal
law consequences of a lie. But the objection here to these sections
and to the statutes, decisions and policy they represent goes deeper.
In the writer's judgment at least, it is simply not sound policy to
require scrupulous honesty and exactitude on the part of our citi-
zens in their unsworn statements to policemen, when, as case after
case in the reports remind us, those statements will often, if not
typically, be made in a highly charged emotional situation during
the course of an illegal confinement in a police station. Surely the
crime of perjury before policemen can at least be put off until the
practices of our law enforcement officers coincide more with the
ideals and principles of our procedural criminal law. And judging
from most recent samplings of federal habeas corpus cases, that will
unfortunately take a long time indeed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Little remains by way of conclusion. One purpose here, of
course, has simply been to show the varied statutory and case law
configurations to be considered in assessing the citizen's modern
day responsibilities to inform on the criminal behavior of others.
And the picture, it is submitted, is not altogether a simple one. Nor
probably has it ever been. Consider, for example, just the initial
irony of the total absence of early English precedent supporting the
existence of misprision of felony as a common law offense as com-
pared with the universal recognition of the offense in some form by
common law commentators such as Coke, Hale and Blackstone. One
thing, however, does seem clear. Flippant modern assertions that
a citizen is under no circumstances currently obliged to inform on
the criminal or at least the felonious activities of third parties
simply cannot be justfied in terms of the statutes and caselaw of
many jurisdictions. While there are few places where one must af-
firmatively seek out a policeman-and perhaps there is no such
place when constitutional considerations are given appropriate
weight-the situation in many states becomes quite different when
one is asked by a policeman to speak out and refuses. And par-
ticularly is this true if the citizen has some ulterior purpose in re-
fusing to cooperate-notably, of course, an intent to aid the felon.
But less culpable states of mind, such as a bare obstinate desire to
obstruct justice, may also in some states suffice for conviction. As
a matter of policy, on the other hand, a citizen should not be re-
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quired to speak out even on police request. Our law enforcement
agencies simply do not require the aid of criminal offenses to hold
over the heads of private citizens who for reasons of their own wish
to remain silent. Prosecution subpoena power at the preliminary
hearing and at the trial coupled with the subpoena power of the
grand jury and the natural desire of most citizens to cooperate with
official authority are amply sufficient to protect the public interest.
The matter of lying to police, of course, is somewhat different.
Certainly the current risks of criminal prosecution for such lying
are much greater than for merely remaining silent when requested
to talk by a policeman and probably much greater, too, certainly
in the federal area, than is currently appreciated by most of the
Bar. That, of course, was one of the central reasons for this under-
taking. More importantly, however, it was designed to show the
unfairness, apart from certain exceptional situations, of penalizing
citizens, and particularly criminal suspects, for their falsifications
to police officers and to urge the repeal of enactments such as Sec-
tion 1001.
